LAUSR

With digital technology becoming increasingly mature, the conditions and strategies for innovation subjects to participate in knowledge innovation in enterprise digital innovation ecosystems are being studied. Based on the evolutionary game theory of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model with a core enterprise, an academic and research institution and an information intermediary as the game subjects, taking the knowledge innovation relationship of the core enterprise as the hypothesis. Combined with simulation analysis, the influence of knowledge innovation subsidies, knowledge absorption and knowledge assimilation on the coordinated innovation strategy of knowledge innovation groups in the game system are discussed. The conclusions are as follows: (1) As the guide to knowledge innovation in digital innovation ecosystems, the core enterprise has the highest knowledge potential, and its innovation strategies directly affect the internal kinetic energy of knowledge innovation in the system; (2) knowledge assimilation capacity and knowledge absorption capacity are positively correlated with the knowledge potential energy of innovation subjects and with the knowledge innovation kinetic energy of the system; and (3) the subsidies provided by the core enterprise significantly enhance the enthusiasm of the academic and research institution and information intermediary to participate in knowledge innovation, but excessive innovation subsidies may lead to opportunism and free-riding and then to “pseudocooperation” within the system. Therefore, the core enterprise should introduce a punishment mechanism. Finally, some suggestions are provided to improve the benign interaction and cooperative evolution of knowledge innovation capability between digital innovation ecosystems and innovation subjects.