LAUSR

In the age of emerging applications, such as Internet of Things (IoT), big data, and data mining, our life becomes more convenient through customized services that utilize a huge amount of personal data generated and collected by various IoT devices. To fully exploit the data value as well as enhance the data utilization, more and more data are being traded in online data markets. While enjoying the benefit from data trading, data sellers are also suffering from severe risk of privacy leakage. In this paper, our objective is to maximize data seller’s received utility via balancing the tradeoff between data trading benefit and data privacy cost. To achieve this, contract theory is utilized to design optimal contract trading mechanisms for both complete and incomplete information markets. From our thorough theoretical analysis, comprehensive simulations, and real-data experiments, the effectiveness of our proposed optimal contract mechanisms can be validated, i.e., the maximum utility can be obtained at the seller side, the individual rationality and incentive compatibility can be guaranteed at the buyer side, and the advantages of our mechanism over the single contract mechanisms can be confirmed.