LAUSR

Internet of Things (IoT) is vulnerable to various cyber attacks due to the massive deployment of IoT devices and the openness of wireless environments. In this article, taking IoT devices as the network resources competed between an attacker and a defender, we study the modeling and analysis of network resource competition in an attack-defense game. The attacker and defender inject different competition strength in each IoT device as their strategies. As a result, the security state of each IoT device will change, which is captured by differential equations. To study the interaction between the attacker and defender and the evolution of the system security states, a zero-sum differential game is formulated by modeling the competition of IoT devices. To achieve the equilibrium of the formulated differential game, optimal control theory is employed to solve the optimization problems of players. Further, a Gauss–Seidel-like implicit finite-difference method is utilized to obtain the saddle point strategy. Finally, numerical results are provided to demonstrate the evolution of network resource competition between the attacker and defender. The results show that our formulated model can effectively and accurately characterize the evolution of the system security states with strategic interactions between the attacker and defender.