LAUSR

Coded distributed computing(CDC) has shown great potentials to solve the unexpected delay caused by stragglers in distributed computing. In this paper, we focus on the auction design for efficient resource allocation in CDC. Specifically, we aim to design a learning auction mechanism to handle heterogeneous user demands and also to free users from the complexity of specifying valuations for resource combinations, which increases exponentially with the resource dimensions. The user demand type is heterogeneous according to different variation trends of the value with finish time and workload, which is modeled by deep learning. The platform would allocate resources according to the user value function. Then users do not need to consider the complex relationship between uncertain finish time and resource configuration in CDC. Due to the inference error of the learning model and the complexity of calculating uncertain finish time, the considered social welfare optimization problem is a non-linear and non-convex integer problem. Even worse, the typical VCG-based payment scheme cannot guarantee truthfulness with the inference error. In response to these difficulties, we transform the social welfare optimization problem into a mixed integer programming problem which already has efficient solutions. The social welfare gap caused by the inference error is analyzed theoretically. The relationship between the utility regret of reporting truthfully and the inference error is also analyzed. We prove that our mechanism satisfies incentive alignment and individual rationality. Extensive experiments show the superiority of our mechanism compared with existing ones.