LAUSR

The end-to-end (E2E) verification enables a voter to check if his ballot is recorded as he intended and the public to check if the system has correctly counted all of the recorded ballots. The Internet voting systems based on the principle of E2E verifiability have many challenges; the most important is its security. Several E2E voting systems have been discussed in the last decade in terms of analyzing the e-voting system and formalizing its security requirements. This article presents an E2E verifiable internet voting system that provides mobility to a voter and allows him to cast his vote secretly in public computer with the benefit of early voting. The proposed system aims to support the election process universally by using the voter's unique identification and biometric features. We propose a new identity-based blind signature scheme that ensures the voter's anonymity. We adopt the Boneh–Lynn–Shacham short signature scheme that ensures the vote privacy with the least ballot size. The system provides a digital witness to a voter that enables him to check whether his vote is recorded as he meant and the public to check if all the recorded ballots are counted correctly. The privacy of the proposed system is achieved under the well-known elliptic curve discrete logarithm and gap Diffie–Hellman assumptions.