LAUSR

A reliable smart grid should possess the necessary security mechanism against any attack aiming at disrupting the electricity market operation. The operation is performed to allocate the final nodal price as per the states estimated in each node. The state estimator can be misdirected by changing the network configuration both at physical and/or information layer, leading to disruption in the market operation. As compared to the physical attack or cyber attack carried out independently, a coordinated cyber-physical attack has a larger impact on the market operation. This article proposes a coordinated cyber-physical attack to maximize the electricity market disruption in terms of deviation in the generation cost between the day-ahead market and real-time market operations. The identification of physical attack causing maximum unintended deviation in the electricity market operation has been formulated as a binary optimization problem. The second stage of the proposed attack involves injecting a state preserving attack vector into the communication channel. The false data injection hides the impact of the physical attack, thereby, refraining the control center from taking necessary actions. The impact of the attack has been quantified in terms of variation in the generation cost and nodal prices between the preattack and postattack scenarios for IEEE 9, 14, and 39-bus power systems.