This letter considers non-cooperative slotted ALOHA (S-ALOHA) games, in which two users contend for the channel by taking one of two actions, i.e., transmit or wait. We obtain an achievable… Click to show full abstract
This letter considers non-cooperative slotted ALOHA (S-ALOHA) games, in which two users contend for the channel by taking one of two actions, i.e., transmit or wait. We obtain an achievable (expected) payoff region of the games with mixed strategy and its Nash equilibria (NE) as a closed form, in which two users want to fulfill their own payoff demand. We further examine the correlated equilibria (CE) of this game and the corresponding payoff region. Finally, by visualizing the achievable payoff region with NE and CE, we discuss how to improve the performance of S-ALOHA systems.
               
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