This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games. The objective is achieved by the following two manners:… Click to show full abstract
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games. The objective is achieved by the following two manners: 1) an interference graph is introduced to describe the interactions among the agents in each coalition and 2) the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is designed with the interference graphs considered. The convergence property of the proposed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is analytically investigated. It is shown that the agents’ actions generated by the proposed method converge to a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium of the graphical $N$-coalition noncooperative games under certain conditions. Several special cases where there is only one coalition and/or there are coalitions with only one agent are considered. The results for the special cases demonstrate that the proposed seeking strategy achieves the solution seeking for noncooperative games, social cost minimization problems, and single-agent optimization problems in a unified framework. Numerical examples are presented to support the theoretical results.
