LAUSR

Single flux quantum (SFQ) technology is currently used as a cryogenic control and readout circuitry of superconducting quantum computers. The low power operation and high switching frequency of SFQ technology are instrumental to efficiently scale a quantum computer. With the growing interest in the hardware security of SFQ circuits, a novel side-channel leakage mechanism in SFQ-to-dc converters is uncovered in this article. The leakage mechanism is investigated for two logic styles, namely, rapid SFQ (RSFQ) and energy-efficient RSFQ (ERSFQ). By observing the fluctuations in the power supply provided by the room temperature electronics, a malicious adversary can extract critical information about the applied input signals. This type of side-channel leakage can lead to serious security vulnerabilities for superconducting electronics and quantum computers. Two potential side-channel attacks that exploit this vulnerability and target SFQ-based qubit control and readout systems are proposed.