LAUSR

The continuous globalization of the semiconductor industry has significantly raised the vulnerability of chips under hardware Trojan (HT) attacks. It is extremely challenging to detect HTs in fabricated chips due to the existence of process variations (PVs), since PVs may cause larger impacts than HTs. In this paper, we propose a novel framework for HT detection in digital integrated circuits. The goal of this paper is to detect HTs inserted during fabrication. The HT detection problem is formulated as an under-determined linear system by a sparse gate profiling technique, and the existence of HTs is mapped to the sparse solution of the linear system. A Bayesian inference-based calibration technique is proposed to recover PVs for each chip for the sparse gate profiling technique. A batch of under-determined linear systems are solved together by the well-studied simultaneous orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm to get their common sparse solution. Experimental results show that even under big measurement errors, the proposed framework gets quite high HT detection rates with low measurement cost.