LAUSR

Reactive jammers, which start attacking upon sensing legitimate transmissions, are serious threats to wireless communications. Conventional anti-jamming methods such as frequency hopping-based anti-jamming schemes are not effective against reactive jammers, especially the agile ones that jam immediately after sensing transmissions. Deceiving-based anti-jamming methods have a great potential in harnessing reactive jammers and securing communication channels for legitimate users. However, in deceiving-based anti-jamming methods, reaching the optimal power and channel allocation is complicated due to the unavailability of the jammers’ channel information. In this paper, we propose deceiving-based anti-jamming schemes against reactive jammers employing reinforcement learning. Moreover, we consider both cases where a reactive jammer can jam a channel or all the channels utilized by legitimate users. In the latter case, we model the interaction between users and the jammer as a non-cooperative Stackelberg game and prove equilibrium. In addition, we study different scenarios where the interacting environment is static or dynamic in terms of channel gains. Simulation results show that in static environments, the proposed methods achieve the optimal values of the total received power and Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio with an accuracy of 95%. Moreover, in dynamic environments, the proposed methods provide high performance in terms of the considered evaluation metrics.