LAUSR

We design short blocklength codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel under information-theoretic security guarantees. Our approach consists in decoupling the reliability and secrecy constraints in our code design. Specifically, we handle the reliability constraint via an autoencoder, and handle the secrecy constraint with hash functions. For blocklengths smaller than or equal to 128, we evaluate through simulations the probability of error at the legitimate receiver and the leakage at the eavesdropper for our code construction. This leakage is defined as the mutual information between the confidential message and the eavesdropper’s channel observations, and is empirically measured via a neural network-based mutual information estimator. Our simulation results provide examples of codes with positive secrecy rates that outperform the best known achievable secrecy rates obtained non-constructively for the Gaussian wiretap channel. Additionally, we show that our code design is suitable for the compound and arbitrarily varying Gaussian wiretap channels, for which the channel statistics are not perfectly known but only known to belong to a pre-specified uncertainty set. These models not only capture uncertainty related to channel statistics estimation, but also scenarios where the eavesdropper jams the legitimate transmission or influences its own channel statistics by changing its location.