LAUSR

This paper investigates the secret-key-authenticated-capacity region, where information-theoretic authentication is defined by the ability of the decoder to accept and decode messages originating from a valid encoder while rejecting messages from other invalid sources. The model considered here consists of a valid encoder-decoder pairing that can communicate through a channel controlled by an adversary who is also able to eavesdrop on the encoder’s transmissions. Over multiple rounds of communication, the adversary first decides whether or not to replace the decoder’s observation with an arbitrary one of the adversary’s choosing, with the goal of the adversary being to have the decoder accept and decode their observation as a valid message (different from that of the encoder). To combat the adversary, the encoder and decoder share a secret key. The secret-key-authenticated-capacity region here is then defined as the region of jointly achievable message rate, authentication rate (a to be defined per symbol measure that will generally represent the likelihood that an adversary can fool the decoder), and the key-consumption rate (how many bits of secret key are needed per symbol sent). This is the first of a two-part study, with the parts differing in their measure of the authentication rate. In this first study, the authentication rate is the exponent of blocklength-normalized exponent of the expected probability of false authentication. For this metric, we provide an inner bound which improves on those existing in the literature. This is achieved by adopting and merging different classical techniques in novel ways. Within these classical secret-key-based authentication techniques, one technique derives authentication capability from secure channel coding to send the secret key with the message, and the other technique derives its authentication capability directly from obscuring the source.