LAUSR

In recent years, vehicular named data networking (VNDN) has quickly ascended to the spotlight and gained enormous popularity, which has emerged as a candidate to support various applications of vehicular communications. VNDN has the potential improve the data dissemination efficiency by mitigating the performance degradation from Internet Protocol (IP) addressing, unstable connectivity and diversified service requirements. With the number of connected vehicles increasing rapidly, the traffic burden of the base station (BS) also grows. As an effective edge computing paradigm, in-vehicle caching can significantly relieve the pressure of the BS. However, the design of a fair caching strategy is still challenging due to the selfish nature of individuals. In this paper, to address the above issues, a popularity-incentive caching scheme (PICS) is proposed in VNDN, where the BS will reward vehicles who execute cache offloading and content sharing with others. To balance the conflict of interest between the BS and vehicles, a Stackelberg game is modeled with rational utilities envisioned. Next, we propose the solution of this game model and evaluate the influence of different weight parameters. Finally, simulation results validate the effectiveness of PICS.