LAUSR

Cryptographic schemes are often deployed in microgrids to protect communication security. However, most existing schemes widely used in microgrids cannot ensure forward secrecy and non-repudiation under key leakage and dishonest insiders. Although some existing cryptographic techniques can theoretically overcome these vulnerabilities, their computational complexity may significantly extend the communication latency, making them less suitable for the time-sensitive microgrid control scenario. In this paper, a novel cryptographic scheme is proposed to guarantee not only confidentiality and integrity but also forward secrecy and non-repudiation of microgrid control communications. Built from key-evolving symmetric encryption and online/offline signature, the scheme can efficiently run in embedded controllers with limited computational resources. The security of the scheme is analyzed in the paper, with a recommended instantiation given through comprehensive comparisons of candidate cryptographic algorithms. Besides, the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme are tested on a microgrid model through cyber-physical co-simulation.