LAUSR

Cancelable biometrics is a powerful remedy for information leakage caused by the extensive usage of unprotected biometric data. Current measures usually suffer from deteriorated accuracy, which is known as the security–performance tradeoff. Motivated by these concerns, in this article, a novel cancelable fingerprint approach, i.e., Indexing-Min–Max (IMM) hashing, is proposed to securely transform a fixed-length fingerprint feature vector to a discrete index hashed code. IMM hashing is essentially established upon the min–max hash and further strengthened by the integration of the partial Hadamard transform, which alleviates performance deterioration while maintaining a high security level. Extensive experiments on FVC2002 and FVC2004 fingerprint datasets coupled with comprehensive theoretical analyses demonstrate the favorable accuracy and strong anti-attack resilience of the proposed method. Besides, compared to the unprotected counterpart, the matching precision of the protected templates yields little accuracy loss or even improved performance, which means the security–performance tradeoff is well handled. Furthermore, IMM hashing also meets the unlinkability and revocability requisites of cancelable biometrics.