LAUSR

Probing attacks against integrated circuits has become a serious concern, especially for security-critical applications. With the help of modern circuit editing tools, an attacker could remove layers of materials and expose wires carrying sensitive on-chip assets, such as cryptographic keys and proprietary firmware, for probing. Most of the existing protection methods use an active shield that provides tamper-evident covers at the top-most metal layers to the circuitry below. However, they lack formal proofs of their effectiveness as some active shields have already been circumvented by hackers. In this paper, we investigate the problem of protection against front-side probing attacks and propose a framework to assess a design’s vulnerabilities against probing attacks. Metrics are developed to evaluate the resilience of designs to bypass an attack and reroute the attack, the two common techniques used to compromise an antiprobing mechanism. Exemplary assets from a system-on-chip layout are used to evaluate the proposed flow. The results show that long net and high layer wires are vulnerable to a probing attack equipped with high aspect ratio focused ion beam. Meanwhile, nets that occupy small area on the chip are probably compromised through rerouting shield wires. On the other hand, the multilayer internal orthogonal shield performs the best among common shield structures.