LAUSR

This article studies the strategic interactions between an IoT service provider (IoTSP) which consists of heterogeneous IoT devices and its energy service provider (ESP). To that end, we propose an economic framework using the Stackelberg game to maximize the network throughput and energy efficiency of both the IoTSP and ESP. To obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), we apply a backward induction technique which first derives a closed-form solution for the ESP (follower). Then, to tackle the non-convex optimization problem for the IoTSP (leader), we leverage the block coordinate descent and convex-concave procedure techniques to design two partitioning schemes (i.e., partial adjustment (PA) and joint adjustment (JA)) to find the optimal energy price and service time that constitute local SEs. Numerical results reveal that by jointly optimizing the energy trading and time allocation for IoT devices, one can achieve significant improvements in terms of the IoTSP’s profit compared with those of conventional transmission methods (up to 38.7 folds). Different tradeoffs between the ESP’s and IoTSP’s profits and complexities of the PA/JA schemes can also be numerically tuned. Simulations also show that the obtained local SEs approach the optimal social welfare when the benefit per transmitted bit exceeds a given threshold.