LAUSR

The moral acceptability of anonymous gamete donation remains contested. Although the view that the value of parent-child relationships should not depend on genetic ties is "nearly axiomatic" among philosophers and bioethicists, one well-known dissenter remains: David Velleman. I argue that most rebuttals to Velleman have simply talked past him because they have failed to understand his fundamental point-that donor conception is a violation of human dignity and as such is wrong even if it does not harm individuals. I challenge Velleman on his own terms by endorsing his metaphysical picture before showing that donor conception is not necessarily a violation of human dignity. I show this by arguing that gamete donation is held to a double standard of self-knowledge. I develop an account of the self that recognizes that certain kinds of challenges to one's flourishing can contribute to an individual's strength and self-knowledge. I defend my view against objections that genetic knowledge is categorically different from other ways of knowing oneself and I show that donor conception can respect human dignity as long as it meets certain conditions.