LAUSR

The first section of Steve Clarke's fascinating and suggestive paper outlines what he takes to be the standard conception of the sanctity of life doctrine (SOL), according to which it consists in attributing intrinsic value to human life, especially in a Christian context. I quite agree with him that this conception is a mistake, and a little research on Google shows that it is widespread, both within and outside philosophy. But it is worth noting what a tricky notion ‘intrinsicness’ is. It could be that those who understand SOL in terms of this notion in factmean that the value of the object in question is incommensurable in certain ways (the OED definition of ‘sanctity’ itself speaks of ‘inviolability’ [2.a]). Further, many of those who characterize the doctrine as Christian may not be implying, or at least not intending to imply, that the doctrine is found only within Christianity, that it applies to all human beings, guilty and innocent, or that it is just another theological doctrine alongside others. Clarke's paper might then be seen as a clarification or precisification of the standard view rather than a set of objections to it. But either way, his points are well taken. On Dworkin, I would not want to disagree with Clarke that Dworkin's eirenic attempt to bring peace to the warring factions in the U.S. abortion debate was less successful than he might have hoped. But I take it that his real intention was not really to do armchair psychology or anthropology, but to persuade each party to accept his conception of the sacred, or at least to accept (a) that the real debate is about the relative weights to give to natural and creative investment in human life, and (b) that freedom of choice in the light of one's own conception of such investment is guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. If this is right, then he can defend himself against Clarke's criticisms. He is advocating a new conception of the sacred, so the facts that it is inconsistent with standard conceptions (according to which sacredness does not increase with investment) and is not found in existing religious texts are not relevant. Dworkin's arguments may be failures, but they are philosophical and rhetorical failures, not psychological or anthropological ones. Was it a mistake for him to present them? Their lack of influence suggests that it probably was, objectively. But as Clarke plausibly suggests at the end of his paper, the gap between the parties in the U.S. abortion debate is huge, and it could be claimed that any attempt to find some common ground was subjectively worth the candle. As Clarke points out in his third section, most religions make a central place for the sacred, as do many nonreligious world views. There are two main elements in the plausible conception of the sacred that Clarke suggests: the transcendental and the incommensurable or inviolable. One interesting question is how these two elements are themselves related. Consider, for example, the claim that some piece of land is sacred. The source of that sacredness may be, perhaps, that God gave it to the people who now occupy it. But why does that support the claim that the land is not only valuable but also inviolable, in the sense of being inalienable to the point that any ceding of it and sharing it would be morally wrong and, indeed, a sin? Here are four possible lines of thought, all of which are problematic. First, it may be that, according to some key religious text, God commanded that their special people and no others occupy this land for ever. But the Euthyphro dilemma makes plausible the idea that a mere divine command is insufficient to justify one's acting on it. God may be very powerful, and indeed may have created us and our world. But usually we do not accept that, just because someone is very powerful, this gives us a reason to obey their commands, except in so far as we may be punished for failing to do so. It might be said that God just has authority, because they are God. To me, however, that seems far from self‐evident. Well, perhaps God is omniscient and morally perfect, so that, even if we do not fully understand why, we should obey their commands.