LAUSR

In recent years, video assistant referee systems have been increasingly used to correct unfair decisions in sports. Similarly, I argue that constitutional referendums play a corrective role in hybrid or competitive authoritarian regimes, where the electoral referee is biased and the government enjoys unfair advantages. Unlike well‐functioning democracies with strong accountability mechanisms or outright authoritarian regimes where elections are meaningless, competitive authoritarian systems still leave room for genuine contestation. Despite the widespread skepticism toward referendums, due to concerns about elite control, lack of deliberation, and majoritarian risks, I suggest that referendums in these hybrid regimes are crucial tools for challenging entrenched rulers. Mainstream constitutional law literature tends to overlook this function. This article challenges conventional approaches by highlighting the necessity of constitutional referendums in Latin America's competitive authoritarian contexts. Using empirical evidence from Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, I demonstrate how referendums were instrumental in confronting leaders who sought to tighten their grip on power, notably by removing presidential term limits. This analysis contributes to broader debates on the role of direct democracy under nonideal democratic conditions.