LAUSR

Extending the theory: responsibility for effects of omissions Unlike outcomes that are the result of actions, outcomes that result from omissions do not usually involve teleological control. Nevertheless, agents are often held responsible for omissions, say, a guard who fails to stop a theft due to inattention or a friend who fails to pick you from the airport due to him playing video games. Moreover, in omissions, more than in actions, agents appear to have reduced responsibility as a result of internal (psychological) factors. To illustrate this, consider two persons, James and Maria, who both promised to pick you from the airport (on separate occasions) but failed to show up. While with James, this happened because he was absorbed in video games, with Maria this happens because she suffers from depression. It appears here that we will judge James more than Maria responsible for your being left stranded at the airport. Furthermore, Maria’s degree of responsibility seems to gradually decrease with her level of depression1. Giving a full account of responsibility assignments in such cases would require extensive discussion. Nevertheless, I will provide a sketch of how the teleological control theory can in principle be developed to account for assignments of degrees of responsibility in effects of omissions. The first point is that need to consider the type of intervention (changes to background circumstances) that we are allowed to make when we probe robustness2.