LAUSR

American voters are frequently reminded of the fact that only the president is elected by the entire country. As the nation's chief executive, the president is uniquely charged with representing the whole country. The president's broad perspective on policy issues is thought to be a defining characteristic of presidential leadership. This view emerged during ratification debates and has been consistently asserted by legal scholars, political scientists, and, most passionately, by U.S. presidents. The claim that the president sees issues from a different perspective than members of Congress do and therefore acts differently is widely asserted, but seldom, if ever, tested as an empirical proposition. I study the effect of the presidency on presidents by comparing the legislative records of 23 individuals who served in both Congress and the White House. The question is whether someone acts differently when representing the entire nation than he does when representing a single state or congressional district. In this analysis, I am interested in political decisions that may be viewed as the expression of personal preferences subject to the constraints of politics. By observing these individuals' legislative records before and after they became presidents, we can determine whether the presidency moderated their behavior. (1) It is important to know how the presidency is likely to affect the policy decisions of someone who aspires to be president. Candidates often claim they will think broadly and work with members of the opposite party, but are these empty campaign promises? Is a candidate's record in Congress a reliable indicator of how s/he will act as president? Selecting the president is perhaps the most important decision voters make and this research helps us evaluate how candidates might act in the White House. Additionally, to the extent that one is troubled by the polarization of the presidency, it is vital to properly diagnose the source of the problem: should we blame presidents or the presidency? Restoring centrist presidential leadership may not be a matter of picking the right person for the job, but rather reforming the presidency. I begin by discussing two contrasting positive theories of presidential representation, noting the evidence in support of each view. Next, I show how these models of representation can be tested by analyzing the legislative records of 23 men who served in both Congress and the White House. Implementing this design requires extensive analysis of roll-call data to estimate the ideal points of presidents and members of Congress on the same scale. Having made these estimates, I find that the presidency effectively moderated presidents' policy preferences for more than a century, but no longer moderates presidents. Rather than moderate presidents, the modern presidency appears to amplify the partisan leanings of the president. The modern presidency compels presidents to assert relatively extreme preferences in the legislative process. I discuss some potential limitations of this analysis and conclude by stating the implication of this research. The Unique Perspective Thesis The differences between the national and local constituencies of presidents and members of Congress is thought to compel presidents to act differently than legislators. The unique perspective thesis is broadly advanced in modern analysis of the presidency. According to (now) Supreme Court Justice Elana Kagan (2000, 2335), "[Bfecause the President has a national constituency, he is likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative policy on an ongoing basis, the preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial interests." Political scientists have similarly maintained that the president has a uniquely broad perspective on national issues. "Elected by a nationwide constituency," Bond and Smith (2008, 461) observe, "the president tends to see issues from a national perspective. …