LAUSR

![Figure][1] Licensing rules for CRISPR technology could impede the development of new therapies. ILLUSTRATION: V. ALTOUNIAN/ SCIENCE J. L. Contreras and J. S. Sherkow's Policy Forum “CRISPR, surrogate licensing, and scientific discovery” (17 February, p. [698][2]) suggests that exclusive licenses granted by the foundational patent holders “could rapidly bottleneck the use of CRISPR technology to discover and develop useful human therapeutics.” To address this problem, Contreras and Sherkow call for the institutions that control patent rights to “ensure…exclusive licenses are narrowly drawn to specific genes.” An independent patent pool like those successfully deployed in the consumer electronics industry would provide a more competitive and effective solution. Pooling the foundational CRISPR patent rights for licensing to industry on nonexclusive, cost-effective, transparent, and nondiscriminatory terms, including royalty-free research by universities, would expand and accelerate commercialization of CRISPR-based products and therapies by providing developers easy access to a package of essential patent rights in a single licensing transaction, thereby allowing them to focus on creation of new products that compete on technological innovation, product quality, service, and marketing. At the same time, the foundational patent owners would be rewarded for their investment from their fair share of reasonable royalties from the pool. As a voluntary market-based business solution to the patent-access problem tailored to balance, incentivize, and resolve competing market and public interests, an independently managed patent pool is superior to solutions imposed from on high, such as march-in rights or compulsory licensing. The pool also would afford yet greater opportunity for all licensees, including those who abrogate limited exclusivity to free up patents for licensing through the pool, to gain broad access to related CRISPR technologies. [1]: pending:yes [2]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.aal4222