LAUSR

In the growing market of health food, certain disturbances occur, such as uneven quality of products, imitation of health food, prohibited drug content in health food, functional efficacy, and actual disagreement. The safety of health food has attracted wide attention from all walks of life. In this study, we constructed a three-party game model of health food safety risk evolution, which includes health food enterprises, health food consumers, and government regulators, based on prospect theory and evolutionary game method. We also consider the attributes of “trust products” of health food, the ability to identify the safety information of health food, the subjective perception of the efficacy of health food, and the certification effect of the regulatory information of the government supervision department. The influence mechanism of these factors, including the cost of searching for health food information, consumers' subjective perception of health food efficiency, and the certification effect of supervision departments, on health food safety risk evolution is described using theoretical deduction and simulation analysis. On this basis, the corresponding conclusions are established, which provide a theoretical basis for further exploration of the strategy of health food market governance.