LAUSR

Aiming at the improvement of innovation efficiency after enterprise obtaining subsidies, this paper constructs two-stage innovation benefit model about research and development (R&D) and transformation and achieves Nash equilibrium of innovative inputs to solve the objective discrepancy of innovation between government and enterprise. The main conclusions are as follows: there are three kinds of resource allocation structure in the way of achieving Nash equilibrium. The allocation structure is determined by the sensitivity of benefits (differentiated by social benefits and enterprise benefits) to R&D and transformation. After obtaining subsidies, enterprise optimizes resource allocation and results in crowding out effect, which is the inevitable choice for enterprise to seek benefits. Relative to the enterprise budget, when the proportion of government subsidies is few, the way of subsidies does not affect benefits. When the government invests more subsidies, which are designated for R&D, there is the possibility of dual losses of social benefits and enterprise benefits. The conclusion defines the proportion of subsidies to enterprise budgets so as to differentiate the allocation structure of innovative inputs. The practical significance is to provide a precise method of resource allocation from the microlevel of enterprise project, which alleviates the objective discrepancy between the government and enterprise.