LAUSR

In the aftermath of India's first nuclear explosion in 1974, U.S. officials concluded that Brazil posed a growing proliferation risk, and they proposed to target Brazil with a new set of nonproliferation policies that included the denial of fuel-cycle technologies. However, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed doubt that such an approach would curb Brazilian nuclear ambitions. Pushing back against influential voices in the U.S. Congress, the State Department, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kissinger argued that Brazil should be allowed to proceed with its plans to master the nuclear fuel cycle in exchange for U.S. assistance and new nonproliferation commitments. He justified this attitude on the grounds of alliance politics (Brazil was too important a pillar of U.S. Cold War policy in Latin America) and the interests of key domestic constituencies (U.S. private companies eyed Brazil's burgeoning nuclear industry). The Brazilian government responded well to Kissinger's approach and would have struck a deal if the transition to the Carter administration had not rendered the bargain untenable.