LAUSR

This contribution examines deprivation of liberty in Belgian healthcare within the frameworks of the ECHR and CRPD. We develop and apply an ECHR-based framework to demonstrate that it is not the admissions to care facilities based on Belgium's involuntary commitment law that give rise to the unjustified deprivation of liberty, but those based on representation regimes. This can be remedied by broadening Belgium's involuntary commitment law. However, doing so would go against a CRPD-based framework, which is incompatible with the ECHR; the former opposes disability-based laws. Building on the right to legal capacity and to liberty, the scope of the CRPD's approach is uncovered. It is suggested that to reconcile the two frameworks, Belgium's involuntary commitment law should be abolished, and representation regimes should be changed to avoid (rather than to justify) deprivation of liberty. Although its desirability is open for discussion, this could solve a problem that occurs worldwide.