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Brokering Bureaucrats: How Bureaucrats and Civil Society Facilitate Clientelism Where Parties are Weak

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Clientelism, the exchange of selective rewards for votes, is fraught with commitment problems and questions remain regarding how it occurs in settings lacking strong parties. In such settings, we argue,… Click to show full abstract

Clientelism, the exchange of selective rewards for votes, is fraught with commitment problems and questions remain regarding how it occurs in settings lacking strong parties. In such settings, we argue, bureaucrats can act as brokers using their own networks. Bureaucrats can use their discretionary power to cultivate reciprocal relations with voters and leverage this political capital in negotiations with politicians to secure career advancements. As brokering requires networks, we hypothesize that bureaucrats with connections to civil society are more likely to exhibit brokering behavior, and especially in localities with stronger civil society. Original survey data of bureaucrats (N=1300) in a context of weak parties, Peru’s 25 regions plus the city of Lima, show that bureaucrats with connections to civil society are more likely to exhibit brokering behavior. Political and party connections are weaker predictors of brokering. The paper thus shows how locally connected bureaucrats may aid in coordinating clientelism.

Keywords: civil society; bureaucrats bureaucrats; bureaucrats civil; clientelism; society; brokering bureaucrats

Journal Title: Comparative Political Studies
Year Published: 2022

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