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Radical enactivism (REC) and similar embodied and enactive approaches to the mind deny that cognition is fundamentally representational, skull-bound and mechanistic in its organisation. In this article, I argue that… Click to show full abstract
Radical enactivism (REC) and similar embodied and enactive approaches to the mind deny that cognition is fundamentally representational, skull-bound and mechanistic in its organisation. In this article, I argue that modellers may still adopt a mechanistic strategy to produce explanations that are compatible with REC. This argument is scaffolded by a multi-agent model of the true slime mould Physarum polycephalum.
Keywords:
virtual slime;
slime marginal;
radical enactivism;
enactivism;
lessons virtual;
cognition
Journal Title: Adaptive Behavior
Year Published: 2020
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Journal Title: Adaptive Behavior
Year Published: 2020
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!