LAUSR

This article is intended as a response to Goldinger et al. and to all those, an increasing minority in the sciences, who still belittle the contribution of embodied cognition to our understanding of human cognitive behaviour. In this article (section 1), I introduce the notion of embodiment and explain its dimensions and reach. I review (section 2) a range of embodied cognition theories and highlight the principles and criteria on which they rely or draw from. I focus (section 3) on three crucial empirical domains in which an embodied perspective has driven novel insights about the relationship between mind and cognition. I argue that embodiment is not just a philosophical mantra empty of empirical content. I draw attention (section 4) to some of the recent ways in which principles underlying embodied cognition have begun to be applied in different fields (contemporary psychology). I review some of these interventions and suggest that discussing these applications not only provides additional evidence against any poverty claim but can also help moving the field forward in important ways. Contra Goldinger et al., I therefore conclude (section 5) that embodied cognition is a very fruitful research programme for the empirical sciences and that can adequately explain many aspects of human cognitive behaviour.