LAUSR

It took a decade for the original calls to provide a progress check in social scientific enterprise within the domain of International Relations (IR) to be reborn in a smaller and more integrated Security Studies scholarship. Two nearly simultaneously published works by Patrick James (2002) and Colin and Miriam Elman (2003) brought the philosophy-of-science debate and the quest for scientific progress to the field of IR studies. Fred Chernoff’s book, Explanation and Progress in Security Studies, although not referring explicitly to these two earlier endeavours, continues the domain’s effort to develop a metric for theory appraisal and to answer the fundamental question: ‘Does the study of international relations and security lead to knowledge?’ (p. vii). Concerned primarily with the limited progress in IR and security studies, when compared with the natural sciences, the book seeks first to define the problem, that is progress, and then to seriously examine obstacles to it within the field. Chernoff’s understanding of progress is that of an ‘approach-to-consensus’ – a dynamic condition presupposing that (a) there exists a point at which social scientists would have to admit that they were wrong in some regards and (b) there is a willingness among scholars, for the sake of progress, to admit that alternative explanations may be better. Why this hasn’t yet been the case is due to the absence of the two aforementioned factors. The different sets of criteria the authors apply to validate their ‘own’ theories and approaches, as well as the absence of wellestablished research and evaluation criteria, are thus to be blamed, the author argues, for the sorry state of affairs in social science. Tellingly, IR scholars and social scientists in general, unlike natural scientists, cannot over time come to agree on facts and explanations, thus preventing the necessary accumulation of knowledge, predictability and progress itself. Chernoff’s effort is thus to determine how authors judge good explanations by thoroughly examining three core debates in security studies: nuclear proliferation, balance of power and alliance formation, and democratic peace. The sample of 10–12 signature works for each area helps to build a solid research basis for establishing what is field-internally understood as ‘evidence’ and how to build explanation strategies. As the book’s findings show, a shared set of criteria has already facilitated greater progress in democratic peace studies, unlike in the other two areas. This seems to duly confirm the book’s hypothesis. In the age of ‘big data’, Chernoff’s reasoned appeal for consensus and progress has a good chance to materialise and level up the evidence and explanation in Security Studies, just as it will bridge the theoretical divides in IR.