LAUSR

A seemingly universal lesson is that anything taken to its extreme is detrimental. Indeed, there has been growing interest in testing this idea within psychology. These studies have often been framed in terms of Aristotle’s doctrine of the golden mean or the idea that virtue lies between the vices of deficiency and excess. Recent explicit reviews of this hypothesis in the psychological literature have led to the paradoxical conclusion that one can have too much virtue (i.e., the too-much-of-a-good-thing effect) despite virtue being identified by the golden mean. We argue in this article that this conclusion is due to a reductionist account of virtues in psychology and the resultant measurement of virtues as general dispositional tendencies in behavior. We review philosophical theory on the golden mean to show that the relationship between virtue and relevant behavior is fundamentally about situation-specific optimality. Using schematic models, we contrast the former measurement approach against the latter to explain the too-much-of-a-good-thing effect and further demonstrate why virtues cannot be properly measured as general tendencies in behavior. We conclude with methodological implications of our theory-informed approach to virtue measurement for research design, evaluation, and conceptualization.