LAUSR

I would like to begin by thanking the editors of New Perspectives for hosting this forum on The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy and the contributors for lending their valuable time and expertise to seriously engage with this book and the important subject of nuclear strategy. The reviewers found much to like about the book. Hamidi ‘‘applauded’’ the book’s central question: seeking to understand the puzzling gap between the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. Ditrych ‘‘admired [its] courage . . . civility . . . and conviction’’ in challenging prevailing conventional wisdom. He found my Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory ‘‘elegant and persuasive,’’ while Onderco approvingly quotes it as ‘‘the most sophisticated case for strategic superiority.’’ Bousquet and Grove state that the argument is ‘‘aptly . . . substantiated by empirical evidence’’ and Hamidi found the qualitative evidence ‘‘particularly compelling.’’ Snyder believes that I ‘‘deserve credit for writing this book’’ and that grappling with it will force even critics to sharpen their views of nuclear strategy. Most readers will be more interested in points of disagreement, however, so I will focus the remainder of my response on these. Unfortunately, I do not have space to address each criticism, so I will focus on three larger themes: the positivist research agenda, rebutting social scientific criticisms of the book, and, finally, I will conclude with a discussion of normative views on nuclear weapons.