LAUSR

India is faced with a conundrum—how to engage with an Afghanistan that is once again led by the Taliban. The question is less about whether to engage and more about how to engage. To understand this turn of events that is both surprising and yet seemingly inevitable, this article examines India’s policies vis-à-vis the Taliban since its early rise to power in 1990. It examines this relationship in four phases which correlate with the fortunes of the Taliban as an opposition and a governing regime, contending that these phases are characterised; by a potential discourse of engagement that does not translate into policy outcomes; distancing and opposition; gradual indirect acquiesce to its growing presence; and finally, détente of sorts without formal recognition. These policy transitions are a consequence of regional and global power play as well as domestic preoccupations of India. They span India’s secular and Hindutva-driven domestic narratives of self. The significance of this article lies in casting a broad overview of the existing literature and identifying patterns of engagement.