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This paper articulates a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian kind of free will—a kind of free will that's incompatible with both determinism and epiphenomenalism—and responds to scientific arguments against the existence of this… Click to show full abstract
This paper articulates a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian kind of free will—a kind of free will that's incompatible with both determinism and epiphenomenalism—and responds to scientific arguments against the existence of this sort of freedom. In other words, the paper argues that we don't have any good empirical scientific reason to believe that human beings don't possess a non-epiphenomenal, libertarian sort of free will.
Keywords:
determinism epiphenomenalism;
determinism;
free determinism
Journal Title: Frontiers in Psychology
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Frontiers in Psychology
Year Published: 2019
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!