LAUSR

Aiming at the dual-channel pharmaceutical supply chain, which consists of two distribution channels, offline medical institutions, and online e-commerce platforms, and taking into account the impact of different strategic choices made by relevant stakeholders on the drugs quality of different distribution channels, this article constructs an evolutionary game model involving the participation of government regulator, pharmaceutical enterprises, medical institutions, and pharmaceutical e-commerce companies. The stable equilibrium points of each participant's strategic choices are solved; the stability of strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov's first method, and MATLAB 2020b is used for simulation to verify the influence of each decision variable on the strategic choice of different participants. The results show that, first, the purpose of punishment is to ensure the drugs quality in the pharmaceutical supply chain, but when the fine is too high, it will restrain the economic behavior of pharmaceutical enterprises, which is not conducive to the performance of social responsibilities by other relevant participants. Second, the probability that government regulator strictly supervises the pharmaceutical supply chain and the probability that pharmaceutical enterprises provide high-quality drugs are negatively related to their additional cost. Third, whether medical institutions and pharmaceutical e-commerce companies choose inspection is affected by multiple factors such as inspection cost, sales price, and sales cost. Furthermore, when the penalty for non-inspection of pharmaceutical e-commerce companies is greater than the threshold Fm0, it can ensure that it chooses an inspection strategy. Finally, this article puts forward countermeasures and suggestions on the drugs quality supervision of different distribution channels in the pharmaceutical supply chain.