LAUSR

Pest and disease control outsourcing has become an effective means to restore damaged arable land and guarantee agroecological benefits. However, it is adopted at a relatively low rate in China. The purpose of this study is to explore, from the perspective of government intervention, behavioral logic, and the game relationship among farmers, service organizations and the government in the pest and disease control outsourcing system as well as the endogenous motivation of each subject. The results indicate that when the degree of policy implementation is low, the government’s policy is ineffective, but, after reaching a certain level, the higher the degree of policy implementation is, the stronger the farmers’ willingness to choose outsourcing control and the service organizations’ willingness to provide positive control services are, and the faster the stable state of tripartite joint pest and disease control is formed. In the case of implementing a single policy tool, the convergence rate of each party that implements the regulatory policy alone is fast but may be unstable, while the rate is slow but more stable when a guidance- or incentive-based policy is solely applied. The effect of a combination of policy tools being applied is much better than that of a single policy tool being applied. The simultaneous implementation of the three types of policy tools can form a policy system with both positive and negative mechanisms, which can maximize the complementary and superposition effects.