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A Game - Theoretic Model for a Stochastic Linear Quadratic Tracking Problem

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In this paper, we solve a stochastic linear quadratic tracking problem. The controlled dynamical system is modeled by a system of linear Itô differential equations subject to jump Markov perturbations.… Click to show full abstract

In this paper, we solve a stochastic linear quadratic tracking problem. The controlled dynamical system is modeled by a system of linear Itô differential equations subject to jump Markov perturbations. We consider the case when there are two decision-makers and each of them wants to minimize the deviation of a preferential output of the controlled dynamical system from a given reference signal. We assume that the two decision-makers do not cooperate. Under these conditions, we state the considered tracking problem as a problem of finding a Nash equilibrium strategy for a stochastic differential game. Explicit formulae of a Nash equilibrium strategy are provided. To this end, we use the solutions of two given terminal value problems (TVPs). The first TVP is associated with a hybrid system formed by two backward nonlinear differential equations coupled by two algebraic nonlinear equations. The second TVP is associated with a hybrid system formed by two backward linear differential equations coupled by two algebraic linear equations.

Keywords: problem; system; quadratic tracking; stochastic linear; linear quadratic; tracking problem

Journal Title: Axioms
Year Published: 2023

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