LAUSR

The distributivity and complexity of separation facilities in waste separation cooperation are incorporated into the factors influencing the payoff of waste separation cooperation. The game payment matrix of waste separation cooperation is constructed based on the distributivity and complexity of separation facilities. The equilibrium solution of waste separation cooperation is obtained through the evolutionary game. The influence of different changes in distributivity and complexity of separation facilities on the willingness to cooperate in waste separation is explored through numerical analysis of cases. The study shows that when the distributivity of separation facilities is certain, the lower the complexity of separation facilities, the higher the willingness of residents and enterprises to cooperate; when the complexity of separation facilities is certain, the willingness of residents and enterprises to cooperate rises and then falls with the increase of distributivity of separation facilities; finally, when the distributivity and complexity of separation facilities change at the same time, the willingness of residents and enterprises to cooperate shows different changes with the different changes of two separation facilities convenience factors.