LAUSR

This paper examines the effects of political hierarchy on firms’ long-term total factor productivity using evidence from the elevation of Chongqing to provincial-level government in China. Using the elevation as an exogenous shock and the Sichuan-Chongqing border as a dividing line, we utilized the spatial regression discontinuity approach to identify the causal link. We found that before Chongqing’s elevation to a provincial-level municipality, the TFP of Chongqing firms was not significantly different from that of Sichuan firms, but after the elevation, the TFP of Chongqing firms near the border was significantly lower than that of Sichuan firms. The mechanism analysis shows that the land transaction price in Chongqing is significantly lower than that in Sichuan Province, which leads to an abundance of low-productivity firms and the “crowding out” of high-productivity firms. We also found that government intervention in Chongqing exacerbates the degree of resource misallocation at the firm level, which together lead to a decline in firm TFP.