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A Nash bargaining solution for Bayesian collective choice problem with general type and action spaces is built in this paper. Such solution generalizes the bargaining solution proposed by Myerson who… Click to show full abstract
A Nash bargaining solution for Bayesian collective choice problem with general type and action spaces is built in this paper. Such solution generalizes the bargaining solution proposed by Myerson who uses finite sets to characterize the type and action spaces. However, in the real economics and industries, types and actions can hardly be characterized by a finite set in some circumstances. Hence our generalization expands the applications of bargaining theory in economic and industrial models.
Keywords:
solutions bargaining;
space;
action;
bargaining games;
general type
Journal Title: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
Year Published: 2017
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Journal Title: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization
Year Published: 2017
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!