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We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the… Click to show full abstract
We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post equilibria. In our equilibria, players commonly learn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.
Keywords:
common learning;
learning cooperation;
cooperation repeated;
state;
repeated games
Journal Title: Theoretical Economics
Year Published: 2020
Link to full text (if available)
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Journal Title: Theoretical Economics
Year Published: 2020
Link to full text (if available)
Share on Social Media: Sign Up to like & get
recommendations!