LAUSR

Valence is a key construct in the affective sciences and in the philosophy of emotion. Carruthers (2011, 2017) has recently offered an account of the nature of valence. He defends a (representational) version of what might be called the non-sensory signal theory of valence (NSS). According to the latter, valence is identified with inner signals—which are not themselves perceptual nor conceptual states of any sort—which mark sensory representations as good or bad. In this paper, I argue that Carruthers’s version of NSS is problematic on its own, independently of the plausibility of competing theories of valence. Carruthers’s arguments to the effect that valence is non-sensory fail to rule out the hypothesis that, together with arousal, valence might also be grounded in bodily, sensory representations. Carruthers’s claim that valence is not a sensory item in the furniture of the mind needs to be then more thoroughly substantiated. Keywords: affect, valence, arousal, interoception.