LAUSR

Biometric templates stored in a database introduce a number of security and privacy risks. The requirements for an architecture that does not suffer from these risks are needed. Therefore, the reference information that is stored in the database must not give sufficient information to make successful impersonation possible. Also, the reference information must be retrieved as little as possible about the original biometrics; in particular it reveals no sensitive information. The proposed system introduces a novel method for template protection and a verification using the merging techniques of chaotic shift keying (CSK) and secret image sharing (SIS). The proposed architecture assures a complete protection framework for the biometric templates, which involves two phases: the first phase is to protect the ID image; a watermark ID image that includes the personal information embedded in the template using a novel watermarking algorithm to generate two shares, and then it is utilized to verify the accuracy of the revealed template. The second phase is for template protection, where the generated shares are encoded separately using CSK and then one share is stored in the database and the other kept with the user. The experimental and comparative results demonstrate that the proposed framework retains the protection of the template and preserves robustness to malicious attacks, while it does not have a discernible effect on the quality of the template.