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Published in 2020 at "Economic Theory"
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01304-x
Abstract: The paper examines notions of incentive compatibility in an environment with ambiguity-averse agents. In particular, we propose the notion of maxmin transfer coalitional incentive compatibility, which is immune to coalitional manipulations and thus more stable…
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Keywords:
transfer coalitional;
compatibility;
maxmin transfer;
incentive compatibility ... See more keywords
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Published in 2021 at "IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control"
DOI: 10.1109/tac.2020.2987802
Abstract: The classic Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all agents, for a static one-shot game. However, it does not appear to be feasible to construct mechanisms that ensure…
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Keywords:
dynamic systems;
truth telling;
balance;
stochastic dynamic ... See more keywords
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Published in 2023 at "Political Research Quarterly"
DOI: 10.1177/10659129231174842
Abstract: Administrative leader turnover adversely affects the organizational stability of U.S. federal executive agencies, as well as undermines presidents’ policy goals. An incentive compatibility theory of administrative leader turnover is proposed that distinguishes between proponent (policy…
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Keywords:
executive agencies;
incentive compatibility;
executive;
policy ... See more keywords
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Published in 2017 at "Theoretical Economics"
DOI: 10.3982/te2008
Abstract: A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibility is satisfied, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution…
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Keywords:
moral hazard;
hazard problems;
incentive compatibility;
approach ... See more keywords