Intensional biases in affordance perception: an explanatory issue for radical enactivism
Sign Up to like & getrecommendations! Published in 2018 at "Synthese"
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-02049-w
Abstract: Radical Enactivism holds that the best explanation of basic forms of cognition is provided without involving information of any sort. According to this view, the ability to perceive visual affordances should be accounted for in… read more here.
Keywords: issue radical; perception; explanatory issue; radical enactivism ... See more keywords
Against Radical Enactivism’s narrowmindedness about phenomenality
Sign Up to like & getrecommendations! Published in 2019 at "Synthese"
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02261-2
Abstract: Radical Enactivism rejects representationalism but nonetheless allows the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as supervening on brain bound elements. In this paper, I argue that Radical Enactivism should reject the possibility of wholly brain-bound phenomenal… read more here.
Keywords: enactivism narrowmindedness; narrowmindedness phenomenality; radical enactivism; enactivism ... See more keywords
Lessons from a virtual slime: marginal mechanisms, minimal cognition and radical enactivism
Sign Up to like & getrecommendations! Published in 2020 at "Adaptive Behavior"
DOI: 10.1177/1059712318824544
Abstract: Radical enactivism (REC) and similar embodied and enactive approaches to the mind deny that cognition is fundamentally representational, skull-bound and mechanistic in its organisation. In this article, I argue that modellers may still adopt a… read more here.
Keywords: virtual slime; slime marginal; radical enactivism; enactivism ... See more keywords