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Published in 2022 at "Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America"
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2105867119
Abstract: Significance Nash equilibrium, of central importance in strategic game theory, exists in all finite games. Here we prove that it exists also in all infinitely repeated games, with a finite or countably infinite set of…
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Keywords:
existence equilibria;
repeated games;
games long;
equilibria repeated ... See more keywords
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Published in 2021 at "Royal Society Open Science"
DOI: 10.1098/rsos.202186
Abstract: Repeated games have provided an explanation of how mutual cooperation can be achieved even if defection is more favourable in a one-shot game in the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation. Recently found zero-determinant (ZD) strategies have substantially…
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Keywords:
strategies repeated;
zero determinant;
determinant strategies;
memory two ... See more keywords
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Published in 2020 at "PLoS ONE"
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0230973
Abstract: Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, a recently found novel class of strategies in repeated games, has attracted much attention in evolutionary game theory. A ZD strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between average payoffs of players. Although…
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Keywords:
average payoffs;
strategies repeated;
zero determinant;
determinant strategies ... See more keywords
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1
Published in 2018 at "Theoretical Economics"
DOI: 10.3982/te2434
Abstract: We study a class of chip strategies in repeated games of incomplete information. This class generalizes the strategies studied by Mobius (2001) in the context of a favor-exchange model and the strategies studied in our…
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Keywords:
chip strategies;
efficient chip;
strategies repeated;
repeated games ... See more keywords
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Published in 2020 at "Theoretical Economics"
DOI: 10.3982/te3820
Abstract: We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisy private signals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex-post…
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Keywords:
common learning;
learning cooperation;
cooperation repeated;
state ... See more keywords