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Published in 2019 at "International Journal of Game Theory"
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00677-1
Abstract: Using a network approach we provide a characterization of a separating equilibrium for standard signaling games where the sender’s payoff function is quasi-linear. Given a strategy of the sender, we construct a network where the…
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Keywords:
equilibrium quasi;
quasi linear;
separating equilibrium;
signaling games ... See more keywords
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Published in 2020 at "European Economic Review"
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103408
Abstract: We study the monotonicity of sender’s equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signalling games. We use counterexamples to show that when the sender’s payoff is non-separable, the Spence-Mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria…
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Keywords:
monotone;
sender payoff;
monotone equilibria;
equilibria signaling ... See more keywords
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Published in 2019 at "IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security"
DOI: 10.1109/tifs.2018.2886472
Abstract: Deception plays critical roles in economics and technology, especially in emerging interactions in cyberspace. Holistic models of deception are needed in order to analyze interactions and to design mechanisms that improve them. Game theory provides…
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Keywords:
modeling analysis;
deception using;
using signaling;
signaling games ... See more keywords